There are two different types of rezoning decisions: area-wide rezones and site-specific rezones. Traditionally, both types of rezones were considered to be purely legislative decisions and, like all legislative decisions, were given a high degree of deference by the courts.  Since the passage of the Land Use Petition Act (LUPA) in 1995, however, site-specific rezones have been considered to be “quasi-judicial” decisions.  This change called into question the level of deference that courts should give to local government decisions on site-specific rezone requests.

On June 16, 2011, the Washington Supreme Court issued a unanimous opinion that clarifies the appropriate level of deference in such cases.  Phoenix Development, Inc. v. City Of Woodinville, No. 84296-5 (Wash., June 16, 2011).  In Phoenix Development, the Supreme Court reversed a prior decision by Division I of the Court of Appeals, which had reversed the City of Woodinville’s denial of two rezone requests.  See Phoenix Development, Inc. v. City of Woodinville, 154 Wn. App. 492, 229 P.3d 800 (2009).  The Supreme Court’s opinion affirmed the long history of judicial deference to site-specific rezoning decisions, despite the fact that such decisions are now considered “quasi-judicial” decisions under LUPA.  It also affirmed earlier holdings giving deference to local choices regarding urban densities under the Growth Management Act (GMA).

Deference to Local Rezoning Decisions

In Phoenix Development, the City of Woodinville denied two requests by Phoenix Development, Inc. to rezone undeveloped property in northeast Woodinville from R-1 (one dwelling unit per acre) to R-4 (four dwelling units per acre).  The City’s decision to deny the rezones was based largely on three issues: (1) there was no “demonstrated need” for the rezones (as required under City code); (2) the rezones were inappropriate because adequate services could not be provided; and (3) the rezones were inconsistent with the City’s comprehensive plan.  Division I reversed the City on each of these issues, and also held that the City had engaged in an unlawful legislative procedure during a quasi-judicial decision-making process.

The Supreme Court rejected these holdings by Division I.  The Court emphasized that the law requires substantial deference to local government decisions, especially where those decisions involve considerations under the GMA.  Because rezones, in particular, involve highly discretionary judgments, the Court was not willing to substitute its judgment for that of the local government.  In this case, the Court deferred to the City of Woodinville’s judgments regarding whether there was a “need” for the rezones and whether the rezones were consistent with the City’s comprehensive plan.  The Court also held that the City’s mischaracterization of its quasi-judicial decision as a “legislative” act was a harmless error.

The Supreme Court’s decision in Phoenix Development restores at least some of the deference historically given to local government rezoning decisions.  That deference had been called into doubt by the Division I decision in Phoenix Development and by an earlier Division II decision that also reversed a local decision to deny a rezone.  See J.L. Storedahl & Sons, Inc. v. Clark County, 143 Wn. App. 920, 180 P.3d 848 (2008) (reversing denial of rezone by Board of County Commissioners on procedural grounds where Board failed to disagree with any findings of fact made by the hearing examiner, who had approved the rezone).  Even in the context of a quasi-judicial rezone decision, the strong deference given to Woodinville’s decision by the Phoenix court approaches the level of deference that courts give to purely legislative decisions.

Deference to Local Choices Regarding Urban Densities

While Phoenix Development was not a GMA case, the Supreme Court’s opinion reinforced prior decisions giving deference to local choices regarding what constitutes an appropriate “urban density” in urban growth areas.  The Supreme Court rejected Division I’s reliance on a Growth Management Hearings Board (GMHB) decision holding that “one-acre lots thwart, rather than encourage, urban development” in Woodinville.  The Supreme Court cited Viking Properties, an earlier Supreme Court decision that had rejected a “bright line rule” adopted by the GMHB defining urban density as at least four dwelling units per acre.  Viking Properties led to a reluctant recognition by the GMHB that densities lower than four dwelling units per acre may still be considered “urban densities.”  (Read more about “bright line rules,” urban and rural densities, and GMA deference here.) 

The Supreme Court in Phoenix Development did not directly hold that one-acre lot sizes are permissible in urban growth areas under the GMA, but the result of its decision was to uphold Woodinville’s R-1 (one dwelling unit per acre) zoning designation.  This fact is likely to be a basis for many future citations to this important Supreme Court decision.